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Currently, there is only one training site for the entire cargo handling force in the U.S. 
Navy and it is located on the East Coast at Williamsburg, Virginia (commonly referred to 
as Cheatham Annex, CAX).  There are many advantages and disadvantages to having a 
single training center.  This study analyzes the costs and readiness implications of 
establishing a second cargo handling training site at Alameda, California, and finds that 
such a secondary site can provide an equivalent level of capability as Cheatham Annex 
and could potentially result in long-term cost reductions and readiness improvements as 
the United States shifts its strategic posture from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  
In order to establish a secondary training site in Alameda there are two categories 
of cargo handling force support requirements that need to be addressed: (1) Life 
Support/Tent Camp and (2) Civil Engineer Support Equipment (CESE).  Alameda offers 
two location options for tent camp construction.  In terms of CESE, only a small portion 
of a reserve NCHB’s actual allowance is located in Alameda.  Two emergent costs result 
from establishing a second training site:  (1) redirected travel and (2) CESE relocation.  
Conducting training for NCHB 3, 5, and 14 in Alameda instead of routing these 
battalions to Williamsburg, can potentially save $2.5 million in travel costs over the 
course of a Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) cycle.  The relocation of CESE 
requires a onetime expenditure of approximately $17,000; however, this relocation would 
necessitate an increase in billeted mechanics to maintain the larger inventory of 
equipment. 
Although costs alone should not drive the decision to establish a complementary 
training site at Alameda, the site would provide long-term cost savings in travel 
expenditures. Most of the costs associated with Alameda will exist whether a training unit 
is established there or not.  The large savings recognized in this report stem from 
reducing the number of cross-country airline flights for the purpose of training.  Basic 
and maintenance phase training could be accomplished in Alameda by flying a limited 
number of TEU instructors to the site. 
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Based upon the analysis and conclusions made in this report, it is recommended 
that NAVELSG establish a West Coast training site in Alameda, California, to increase 
force readiness and reduce expenditures associated with moving personnel to the training 
site. The following specific actions are recommended: 
 Transfer CESE to Alameda as manning grows. 
 Do not duplicate the TEU in Alameda. 
 Conduct basic and advanced cargo courses at Alameda for West Coast 
units. 
 Leverage NCHB SME knowledge. 
 Establish training event teams. 
 Execute with deliverables. 
 Implement Control Measures. 
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I. DEFINITION OF PROBLEM AND RATIONALE 
A. BACKGROUND 
The nation’s leaders are responsible for maintaining warfighting readiness to meet 
strategic objectives and safeguard the country’s security.  Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO), issued CNO Guidance for 2010 stating, “[m]y focus areas 
remain to build the future force, maintain our warfighting readiness, and develop and 
support our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.  These focus areas will endure 
throughout my tenure.”1  His posture builds from the overarching maritime strategy set 
forth in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21), the primary tenets of 
which are critically dependent upon a persistently capable and ready maritime 
organization.2 
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Navy (USN) continue to 
search for efficiencies in readiness and the budget that applies to it.  The senior leadership 
of Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) commands a force of 
2,900 active and reserve sailors spread throughout the United States, is in charge of the 
mission readiness of the entire cargo handling force of the U.S. Navy, and has the 
responsibility of establishing and implementing guidance and policy for logistics, 
operational asset management, and allocation. 
NAVELSG asked the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to conduct a study to 
determine the cost and readiness implications of establishing a second cargo handling 
training site in Alameda, California.  This MBA report forms the second in an anticipated 
series of studies conducted by NPS for the continued improvement of NAVELSG.  The 
original project used simulation modeling to explore major time and capacity constraints 
experienced within the NAVELSG instructor and assessor qualification process.  As a  
 
                                                 
1 Gary Roughead, “CNO Guidance for 2010: Executing The Maritime Strategy” (Washington, D.C., 
2010), 1. 
2 James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, and Thad W. Allen, “A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century 
Seapower (CS-21).” (Washington, D.C., 2010), 1–20. 
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result of the report’s recommendation, the organization now conducts more remote assist 
visits to minimize classroom instruction and has hired civilian instructors to increase 
capacity and limit retraining.3 
NAVELSG and the Training Evaluation Unit (TEU) have been effectively 
training cargo handlers to perform missions worldwide for years.  With two wars 
currently in progress, and the demand for cargo movement capability being extremely 
high, the reserve mobilizations and operations tempo continue to remain elevated.  The 
NAVELSG and TEU are searching for ways to increase efficiencies while maintaining 
the highly sought after capabilities of their force.  There have been dramatic 
transformations in the reorganization of its command elements and units, all of which 
were the first stages of aligning their forces to meet mission readiness, manning, and 
capability sources for combatant commanders. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Currently, there is only one training site for the entire cargo handling force in the 
U.S. Navy, and it is located on the East Coast at Williamsburg, Virginia (commonly 
referred to as Cheatham Annex, CAX).  The CAX site, where the TEU is located, is a 
single-point training center for the cargo force.  It is a robust site located in the midst of a 
major fleet concentration area.  There are many advantages and disadvantages to having a 
single training center.  This study analyzes the cost and readiness implications of 
establishing a second cargo handling training site at Alameda, California. This analysis is 
one option for NAVELSG’s continued search for increased readiness. 
This study required numerous site visits and the analysis of a vast array of data.  
The focus centered on the current laydowns and assets at both the Williamsburg and 
Alameda sites.  The strategic objectives of the nation were incorporated into the analysis 
of this study.  Additionally, the Chain of Command (CoC) develops intent, objectives, 
guidance, and policies and was consulted throughout the study.  In order to limit the 
scope of the study and provide value to the Navy, we used the training resources at 
                                                 
3 Christopher W. Eckols and Jeffrey A. Tomaszewski, “Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, 
Training and Evaluation Unit: An Analysis of Current Operations while Searching for Training 
Efficiencies,” (Professional Report In Business Administration, 2009), 40. 
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Williamsburg as a baseline with respect to capabilities and then determined what it would 
take to replicate those capabilities at the Alameda site. 
C. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The guidance and policies at all levels within the CoC were essential to 
constructing an accurate picture of an Echelon IV command, such as the NAVELSG.  
This study was limited to the analysis of the NAVELSG’s training organization 
(TRAINORG), which is their TEU.  The TEU standardizes the training processes, 
programs, and procedures of the NAVELSG units.  The TEU also manages and provides 
training for the cargo handling battalions and serves as the Point of Contact (POC) and 
coordinator to validate and ensure consistency in training and curricula for the formal 
cargo handling schoolhouse.  For consistency of training, it is essential that a second 
training site has the capability to train sailors to the same standards as those in CAX.  
This study required the establishment of a benchmark standard for CAX’s infrastructure 
and training assets so that the Alameda site could be evaluated against this benchmark.  
We also took a thorough inventory of the Alameda infrastructure and assessed its current 
capability to meet current training needs.  The review of all relevant instructions and 
policies, as well as the formulation of cost estimates, was critical for making a balanced 
and thorough assessment of the Alameda site to match the Williamsburg site capabilities.  
The recommendations in this study are based upon an analysis of the infrastructure, 
training assets and cost to complement the capability of the Williamsburg site at 
Alameda. 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows.  Chapter II introduces a 
framework for linking mission objectives of the cargo handling force to the nation’s 
maritime strategy; it details the complete command structure and each particular 
element’s role and how it impacts readiness.  Chapter III discusses the assets necessary to 
effectively conduct training at the Alameda site that is equivalent to the standards at CAX 
in Williamsburg, Virginia.  Chapter IV emphasizes the cargo handling force support 
requirements needed to conduct cargo operations, and the associated TOA is described in 
detail.  Chapter V discusses the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) and the costs 
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associated with training an Echelon V Navy Cargo Handling Battalion (NCHB).  Chapter 
VI summarizes our conclusions, makes several recommendations and identifies 
opportunities for future research. 
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II. MISSION OBJECTIVES AND SUPPORTING 
ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter establishes a framework of the mission objectives of the cargo 
handling force within the scope of the nation’s maritime strategy.  It details the complete 
command structure and each particular element’s role impacting readiness. 
A. MISSION OBJECTIVES/RESERVE FORCE 
The Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 2010) describes in detail how USN 
forces play a vital role in preventing and winning wars.  The cargo handling force, in 
particular, performs missions that directly contribute to the effectiveness of the Navy and 
is a sustaining factor in the establishment of a geographic theater. 
The strategic gaze of the United States has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
As operations and exercises focus on and take place in the Pacific and Asian rim, the U.S. 
Navy must be able to generate and sustain forces in this region to meet future missions 
requirements.  In addition to projecting power and winning kinetic conflicts, the NOC 
2010 describes Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations as a 
essential core capability.4  Every mission, operation, and exercise requires supplies, 
sustainment materiel, and equipment that is likely to be managed, secured, or unloaded 
by cargo handlers. 
The cargo handling force is tasked with a diverse list of missions requiring it to 
operate in every environment, on land and sea, on airfields and ships, on all seven 
continents.  The capability of the cargo handling force hinges on their state of readiness 
and given the current level of uncertainty in the world, the USN has substantially 
increased the mobilization of reservists to meet the security demands of the nation.  
Forty-eight percent of the NECC force is comprised of Reserve Component (RC) 
members.  Admiral Debbink, Chief of Naval Reserve Force (CNRF), addressed the 
Senate Committee of Appropriations in March 2009 focusing on the capabilities, 
                                                 
4 James T. Conway, Gary Roughead, and Thad W. Allen, “Naval Operations Concept 2010.” 
(Washington, DC, 2010), 47. 
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capacity, and the readiness of the Navy’s Reserve Component (RC).  He emphasized the 
vital role it plays to the total force concept stating that:  
[I]n 2008 alone, nearly 2,300 RC members from 17 NECC units deployed 
globally, with more than 95 percent of the deployed units and personnel 
supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of 
Responsibility (AOR).  NECC RC forces continue to support operations 
that include: construction/engineering operations with the Naval 
Construction Forces (e.g., Construction Battalions, or SEABEEs), 
maritime expeditionary landward and seaward security with Maritime 
Expeditionary Security Forces (MESF), Customs Inspections and 
port/cargo operations with Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group 
(NAVELSG), war fighting documentation with Combat Camera, 
document and electronic media exploitation with Navy Expeditionary 
Intelligence Command, and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 
training with the Expeditionary Training Command.5 
Providing the necessary and relevant reservists’ training to meet those security 
demands remains a top priority.  This study evaluates the cost and impact of establishing 
a second, complementary training site to meet the training needs that will support a 
highly ready reserve force that is prepared to execute its mission. 
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of February 2010 focused on the 
ongoing reform and the changes within the USN.  The QDR prioritizes budgeting, policy, 
and program priorities to meet current demands and future posture requirements.  With 
this focus in mind, the U.S. leadership has instituted sweeping reforms to maximize 
capability, programs, and budgets to meet those demands.  A large number of forces will 
likely continue operating in Afghanistan and Iraq while providing presence throughout 
the globe.  The QDR notes that the USN will experience higher deployment rates and 
briefer dwell periods for the next several years thus requiring the mobilization of reserve 
components.  These global demands have required reserve units to be remobilized 
frequently.6  Figure 1 shows the significant reserve force activations that have taken place 
from September 11, 2001, to September 21, 2010. 
                                                 
5 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, “Statement of Vice Admiral Dirk 
J. Debbink, Chief of Navy Reserve,” 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 2009, 5. 
6 U.S. Department of Defense, “2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (Washington, DC, 2010), 
vii. 
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Activated as of 9/21/10:  103,875 
Deactivated Since 9/11/01: 682,114 
Total:     785,989 
 
Figure 1.   Unique Reserve Component Activations 
(From Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010) 
The CNO issued the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy (DRRS-N) 
instruction in January 2008.7  The purpose of this instruction was to specify the policy, 
procedures, and responsibilities of the USN in regards to readiness.  The DRRS-N system 
measures and reports the readiness of Navy forces through the construct of Mission 
Essential Tasks (METs).  A MET is a basic task constrained under given conditions and 
performed at a specific standard.  A grouping of organizational METs make up a Mission 
Essential Task List (METL) and forms an organization’s framework of those tasks 
essential to the accomplishment of assigned or anticipated missions.8  Table 1 identifies 
the primary and/or secondary missions required of a NCHB.  A full listing of an NCHB’s 
operational capabilities is found in Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
7 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 3501.360: Defense Readiness Reporting 
System – Navy. (Washington, DC). 
8 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, COMNECCINST 3500.3: Navy Mission Essential Task 
List. (Williamsburg, VA). 
Differences are based upon changes from previous week
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Table 1.   NCHB Mission Areas 
(From Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2008) 
Mission Area 
Rapidly deploy and/or mobilize personnel as mission-tasked detachments, 
independent units, or groups responding to worldwide requirements. 
Load and discharge cargo carried in Military Sealift Command (MSC) owned 
and chartered commercial ships, either via in-stream or pier-side operations. 
Load and discharge passengers, mail, and cargo from Airlift Mobility 
Command (AMC) or military-controlled aircraft, including transporting bulk 
mail to a distribution center. 
Operate an expeditionary ocean and air cargo terminal. 
Report and handle ordnance including the receipt and transshipment of 
ordnance from Combat Logistics Force ships, MSC ships or MSC-chartered 
commercial ships at an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). 
Operate aircraft/ground support equipment (GSE), such as refueling systems. 
Operate and maintain bulk fuels storage facilities and laboratories. 
Provide a forward Command and Control (C2) element to augment Theater 
Task Forces/Groups to facilitate logistics requirements for forward-deployed 
NCHB 
Provide Combat Service Support (CSS).  This function is typically organic to 
NAVELSG units but can augment external forces if directed.   
Assist NELR in Adaptive Planning and Crisis Action Planning processes when 
required. 
Provide feedback on training curricula. 
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When analyzing the benefits of establishing a training area in Alameda, these 
mission areas and the training necessary to perform them are considered.   
B. COMMAND STRUCTURE 
1. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
In September 2005, the CNO established NECC headquartered in Little Creek, 
Virginia, subordinate to Fleet Forces Command (FFC). This organization structure 
aligned all expeditionary forces under NECC in order that it may serve as the core 
manager of the readiness, resourcing, manning (active and reserve), training and 
equipping of such naval forces.9  The NAVELSG is the cargo handling force subordinate 
component of NECC.  The NECC has a wide range of capabilities and is comprised of 
sailors that are trained in those areas described in Table 2. 
Table 2.   NECC Force Capabilities 
(From Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, 2010) 
Riverine Establishes and maintains control of rivers and waterways for military 
and civil purposes, denies their use to hostile forces and destroys 
waterborne hostile forces as necessary. The Riverine force combats sea-
based terrorism and other illegal activities, such as transporting 





Provides a wide range of construction in support of operating forces, 
including roads, bridges, bunkers, airfields and logistics bases; provides 
responsive support disaster recovery operations; performs civic action 
projects to improve relations with other nations; and provides anti-
terrorism and force protection for personnel and construction projects. 
There are seven Naval Construction Regiments that exercise command 
and control over the twenty one battalions and other specialized units, 




Conducts counter-IED operations, renders safe explosive hazards and 
disarms underwater explosives such as mines. EOD specialists can 
handle chemical, biological and radiological threats and are the only 
military EOD force that can both parachute from the air to reach distant 
targets or dive under the sea to disarm weapons. EOD’s Mobile Diving 
and Salvage Units clear harbors of navigation hazards, engage in 
underwater search and recovery operations, and perform limited 
                                                 
9 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, COMNECCINST 5440.3: Mission, Functions, and Tasks 
for Commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group. (Norfolk, VA), 1. 
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Supplies highly trained, scalable, and sustainable security teams capable 
of defending mission critical assets in the near coast environment.  
Expeditionary Security units provide worldwide maritime and in-shore 
surveillance, security and anti-terrorism force protection, ground 
defense, afloat defense, airfield/aircraft security and a wide range of 
secondary tasks from detention operations to law enforcement. 
Expeditionary 
Intelligence 
Delivers flexible, capable and ready maritime expeditionary intelligence 
forces that respond rapidly to evolving irregular warfare area 
intelligence requirements. Intelligence teams supply expeditionary 
warfighters with timely relevant intelligence to deny the enemy 
sanctuary, freedom of movement and use of waterborne lines of 
communication while supported forces find, fix and destroy the enemy 
and enemy assets within the operational environment. 
Expeditionary 
Logistics 
Delivers worldwide expeditionary logistics with active and reserve 
personnel to conduct port and air cargo handling missions, customs 
inspections, contingency contracting capabilities, fuels distribution, 
freight terminal and warehouse operations, postal services and ordnance 
reporting and handling. 
Maritime 
Civil Affairs 
Is an enabling force working directly with the civil authorities and 
civilian populations within a Combatant Commander’s maritime area of 
operations to lessen the impact of military operations imposed during 




Supports the efforts of the Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security 
Cooperation by delivering timely, focused, and customizable training to 
designated host nations.  Security Force Assistance draws training 
expertise from NECC forces and DoD to support in training delivery. 
Host nation training also supports critical regional stability by helping 




Generates video and still documentation of combat operations, 
contingencies, exercises and Navy events of historical significance. 
COMCAM is a visual information acquisition unit, dedicated to 
providing rapid response aerial, surface and subsurface visual 




Coordinates and oversees all administrative processing, equipping, 
training, deployment and redeployment of Sailors assigned as 
Individual Augmentees, In-Lieu of forces and to Provisional Units 
committed to Joint and Maritime Operations. 
 
The NECC promulgates and sets policy for the training of all expeditionary units.  
The primary reference applicable to achieving war fighting readiness, as previously 
noted, is the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Training Manual (NECC 
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TRAMAN).10  The training manual is comprised of references and principle instructions 
from FFC and NECC and provides the necessary guidance for the execution and 
administration of their training continuum.  The TRAMAN also provides overall 
governing rules for assessment events and determining certification levels to execute the 
FRTP, which is discussed in Chapter V. 
2. Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) 
NAVELSG is located in Williamsburg, Virginia (Echelon IV), commonly 
referred to as Cheatham Annex (CAX).  NAVELSG’s mission is to deliver expeditionary 
logistics capabilities to theater commanders with active duty and mobilization-ready 
naval reserve sailors and the equipment required by operational plans (OPLANS), joint 
task force contingency operations, and in support of national military strategy. 
COMNAVELSG also provides logistic support during emergent task force missions, 
humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.  COMNECC has delegated authority to 
COMNAVELSG to provide expeditionary logistic support, disaster relief operations, and 
to conduct port and air cargo handling missions worldwide.  COMNAVELSG is the 
Immediate Supervisor in Command (ISIC) with Administrative Control (ADCON) to 
oversee the inspection and assessment for the performance and readiness of its 
subordinate regiments and battalions. 
NAVELSG develops policies, guidance, and procedures to optimize the readiness, 
employment and placement of active/reserve component (AC/RC) personnel.  These 
actions are vital to ensuring the readiness of current and future force structure.  
COMNAVELSG assists COMNECC in concept development, planning, and budgeting 
for current and future navy expeditionary missions to meet requirements across the full 
range of military operations.  NAVELSG utilizes the NECC TRAMAN as the basis for 
its own training manual and provides supplemental guidance to its units.  This 
NAVELSG TRAMAN is specific in nature and includes the training requirements for the 
cargo handling force under the NAVELSG cognizance. 
                                                 
10 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, COMNECCINST 3502.1A: Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command Training Manual. (Williamsburg, VA). 
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To limit the scope of this analysis, this report will focus on one of those 
regiments, 5th Navy Expeditionary Logistics Regiment (NELR).  COMNAVELSG is 
vital to three main aspects of this analysis because it: 
a) has budget authority to fund a West Coast training site; 
b) is intimately involved is all aspects of training from beginning to end, and; 
c) established a subordinate schoolhouse, the Training Evaluation Unit 
(TEU), which provides all schooling, assessments, and certification of reserve NCHBs. 
3. Navy Expeditionary Logistics Regiment (NELR) 
A NELR serves as the Immediate Supervisor in Command (ISIC) for assigned 
NCHB(s) and Expeditionary Communications Detachments (ECD).  Comprised of 
twenty six personnel, each NELR provides administrative oversight and command and 
control (C2) over its assigned battalions.  The regiment maintains units to provide multi-
function capabilities with organic C2 to support expeditionary logistics, cargo handling 
and pier and terminal operations whenever and wherever demanded.  Specifically, the 
NELR is responsible for mentoring, training, supervising, and assessing its subordinate 
units.  Figure 2 provides a line diagram of the NELRs’ hierarchy as well as their physical 
location. 
The 5th NELR is the regiment that would be most impacted by the creation of a 
West Coast training unit.  Figure 3 depicts the regional footprint of the 5th NELR.  
Although each of its NCHBs are established in three distinct locations, each NCHB 
operate companies apart from its headquarter unit.  It should be noted that the 
organizational structure and authority from NAVELSG in the administration of training 
has not been determined.  In the event that the training unit is stood up, those decisions 
and framework would be established by NAVELSG.  The analysis of this report is 
limited to conducting training on the West Coast in accordance with current infrastructure 
standards of Williamsburg. 
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Figure 2.   COMNAVELSG Organizational Structure 
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Figure 3.   Fifth Navy Expeditionary Logistics Regiment Laydown 
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4. Navy Cargo Handling Battalion (NCHB-3,5,14) 
NAVELSG commands eleven NCHBs: one active component, ten reserve 
components.  Each battalion consists of personnel assigned to Headquarters Company, 
Surface Cargo Companies, Air Cargo Companies (ACCs), Expeditionary Support 
Companies (ESCs), Cargo Terminal Companies (CTC), and Fuel Companies.  The 
manning level of each unit is annotated in parenthesizes in Figure 4. The NCHBs can 
rapidly deploy or mobilize as mission-tasked detachments or independent units in 
response to worldwide requirements to load and discharge cargo and ordnance from 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, MSC-controlled commercial ships and Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF) ships in-stream or pier-side.  NCHBs can also load and discharge 




Figure 4.   Navy Expeditionary Logistics Battalion Structure 
(From Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, 2009) 
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C. SUPPORT STRUCTURE 
1. Training Evaluation Unit (TEU) 
The Training Evaluation Unit (TEU) is NAVELSG’s “Executive Agent” for 
training and evaluation of its subordinate units.  The TEU evaluates unit readiness 
through the FRTP and represents NAVELSG’s training organization (TRAINORG).  The 
FRTP is a de-conflicting schedule of major milestones and events that a unit must 
perform to achieve the appropriate level of readiness in order to deploy on mission.  The 
TEU ensures standardization in conducting and assessing training and mission 
proficiencies and is the centralized point of contact for all of NAVELSG’s units 
regarding training.  Training is conducted through formal courses as well as mobile 
training teams. 
 20
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III. INFRASTRUCTURE 
This chapter will discuss the assets necessary to effectively conduct training 
equivalent to the standards at CAX in Williamsburg, Virginia, at the Alameda site.  The 
term “infrastructure” as it applies to this report will be limited to that portion of the 
infrastructure that is necessary to properly train a NCHB.  The infrastructure includes lay 
down areas, training sites, buildings, ship assets, aviation assets, crane assets, and 
miscellaneous structures required to conduct the applicable training venue.  When 
evaluating the capabilities of the Alameda training site, CAX is considered the standard 
against which we will benchmark. 
Consistency across the force in all training aspects provides NAVELSG with the 
ability to surge and merge forces from various battalions.  This flexibility has enabled 
NAVELSG to successfully conduct its missions worldwide.  We will first identify the 
current CAX infrastructure, followed by the Alameda infrastructure, and then finally 
discuss the similarities and differences between the sites.  This comparison will highlight 
key decision variables in the establishment of an Alameda training site. 
A. CHEATHAM ANNEX (CAX) OVERVIEW 
The CAX training site has been operational since the 1940s.  The analysis of the 
CAX site is limited to the infrastructure use during the training.  The FRTP encompasses 
key milestones and events used to achieve the proper readiness for a deployable battalion.  
Two important training events are Unit Level Training (ULT) and the Unit Level 
Training Readiness Assessment (ULTRA).  ULT is specific training designed to prepare 
a battalion for an ULTRA.  The two are conducted in sequence with the ULT preceding 
the ULTRA.  The ULTRA is the most stringent of the training phases and serves as the 
final exam and certification of a NCHB to conduct full scale cargo operations in an 
austere environment.11 
                                                 
11 Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, “Training Evaluation Unit Functions and Structure” 
(NECC Commander’s Conference Powerpoint Presentation, Williamsburg, VA, December 2009), 3–4. 
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Although certain conditions cannot be replicated, such as a foreign country’s 
environment and weather conditions, the TEU maximizes its resources to facilitate the 
most realistic scenario possible. 
 
Figure 5.   Cheatham Annex (CAX) Overview (From Google Maps, 2010) 
Figure 5 shows CAX as a robust open area encompassing numerous training 
assets with the freedom to perform transport trucking and other cargo operations.  Having 
training areas to conduct large scale and simultaneous operations is invaluable.  In 
addition to the opportunities afforded within the perimeter of CAX, there are other nearby 
sites, such as Newport News, that provide expanded environments in which to carry out 
exercises.  These sites are not all inclusive; however, it should be noted that due to past 




As one can see from Figures 6 through 13, operations can be conducted 
simultaneously without impact to one another.  These operations include but are not 
limited to: 
1. Pier operations; 
onload/offload of ships 
2. Marshalling yards 
3. Crane operations 
4. Ammo operations 
5. Air cargo operations 
6. Tent camp operations 
7. Winch and stay operations 
8. Various MHE operations; Kalmar, 
K-Loader and 10k Rough Terrain 
(RT) operations 
9. Maintenance facilities  
10. Cargo transport trucking 
11. Entry Control Point (ECP) 
exercises 
Figure 6.   Cheatham Annex Pier 
(From Google Maps, 2010) 
12. Expeditionary convoy operations 
13. 463L Pallet building 
14. Emergency Helo evacuation 
15. HMMV operations 
16. Large scale land navigation 
17. Joint operations 
18. Chemical Biological Radiological 
Defense (CBRD) training 
19. Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
perimeter defense 
20. Higher Echelon interaction due to 
location  
21. Secure radio/SIPR  
communications 
Figure 7.   Landship Site  
(From Google Maps, 2010) 
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Figure 8.   C-130 Site 
(From Google Maps, 2010) 
Figure 9.   Hagglund Crane Site 
(From Google Maps, 2010) 
 
Figure 10.   Crane Site (From Google Maps, 2010) 
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Figure 11.   Peninsula Overview (After Google Maps, 2010) 
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Figure 12.   Newport News Ship Berths (From Google Maps, 2010) 
 
Figure 13.   Ship/Mini Marshalling Yard (From Google Maps, 2010) 
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B. ALAMEDA OVERVIEW 
In 1995, Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda was closed as a result of the 
congressional Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) process.  The 
majority of the base facilities and assets were bought in 2006 by the city of Alameda for 
$108 million.12  Key assets needed by a reserve NCHB to conduct an ULTRA or scalable 
training remain available.  The most important assets are the ships that belong to the 
Maritime Administration (MARAD).  The MARAD was intimately involved with 
decisions made by the city of Alameda to ensure that they had a long-term lease to utilize 
the piers.  The importance of this lease cannot be overstated and the existence of this 
lease is a key assumption supporting the analysis; without the ships available at Alameda, 
a reserve battalion would be unable to conduct shipboard training and thus not meet the 
requirements of their primary mission. 
Over the course of the last ten years, the city has planned the complete 
revitalization of the land that was once NAS Alameda.  Due to current economic 
conditions and legal disputes with the development company contracted with 
constructing the new site plan, timelines continue to shift to the right.13  These delays 
actually benefit the Navy cargo handling force.  The Navy cargo handling force with 
MARAD has established Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) to conduct training on 
the south end of what was once NAS Alameda.  The cost in utilizing a MARAD ship for 
training are the same whether it is on the East Coast or West Coast.  The most recent 
MARAD pricing from a summer exercise is found in Appendix B.  MARAD ships in the 
ready reserve are located throughout the country.  The laydown of those ships is found in 
Appendix C. 
The Alameda infrastructure is robust and allows for numerous training 
opportunities.  Unlike Williamsburg, the various sites associated with Alameda are not 
collocated in the same location; however, the majority of the vital assets to conduct 
complex training are within five miles of each other.  It is important to note that any 
                                                 
12 City of Alameda. “Alameda Point Community Partners Declines To Proceed With Developing 
Alameda Point.” (Press Release, Alameda, CA, Sept 21, 2006), 1. 
13 Michele Ellson, “SunCal Sues The City Of Alameda,” The Island, August 5, 2010. 
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analysis associated with Alameda has to be considered from a reserve perspective.  With 
CAX being manned by AC 365 days out of a year, that site provides consistency and less 
room for error.  The proper planning and execution of utilizing the infrastructure to the 
fullest is essential.  To understand the scope of difference, one should consider Alameda 
being utilized for two different two-week Annual Training (AT) exercises.  The 
infrastructure would support a 365-day presence, if needed. 
Figure 14 shows the laydown and training areas afforded to the reserve battalions. 
Of course no permanent structures or facilities can be built, however the old structures 
are available for use.  One cannot predict the future relationships between the city of 
Alameda and MARAD; however, there is currently a twenty-year lease between the two 
that would indicate a long-term commitment.14 
 
Figure 14.   Alameda Waterfront (From Google Maps, 2010) 
                                                 
14 City of Alameda, Alameda Reuse and Redevelopment Authority, “Recommendation to Approve a 
20 year Lease with the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD).” 
(Memorandum, Alameda, CA, Feb 1, 2006), 3-B. 
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Figure 15.   Alameda Crane Ships 
NCHB3 has been conducting reserve operations at its local Navy Operational 
Support Center (NOSC) for a number of years.  The NOSC compound itself is relatively 
new and has sufficient space, lay down and facilities to support the five hundred Navy 
and Marine Corps reservists.  When discussing the NOSC infrastructure it will be divided 
into two areas; main building and maintenance/warehouse facilities.  The main building 
has ten classrooms, in excess of the five classrooms needed to conduct classroom 
training.  It also has conference rooms, hygiene facilities, and an array of other amenities.  
At the time of writing this analysis, it would be appropriate to say the classroom facilities 
are in better condition than any of the classrooms in CAX.  The accuracy of this 
statement will be short-lived due to a multi-million dollar training facility currently under 
construction in CAX. 
In order to have the capability of providing effective training, the maintenance 
infrastructure must be considered.  The maintenance/warehouse facilities are minimal but 
appropriate for the current Civil Engineering Support Equipment (CESE) and supplies on 
location.  The maintenance facility floor plan is provided in Appendix D.  To conduct a 
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full ULTRA that CESE inventory would need to increase.  The current maintenance 
facility would require additional assets, tools, and miscellaneous equipment.  No analysis 
is conducted in this paper to establish the additional costs associated with increasing 
manning to perform maintenance.  That analysis would be outside the scope of 
establishing a training site in Alameda mainly due to the myriad combinations of 
different CESE packages the higher echelon would deem necessary to be located in 
Alameda.  The analysis of the associated maintenance costs of additional CESE located 
in Alameda is recommended as future research.  
To alleviate any confusion, an example is provided.  Consider the total 
requirements for an entire reserve battalion, which is seven M-915 trucks.  It would be 
unrealistic to have those seven trucks located in Alameda when the usage would only 
require three or four based on a reasonable training scenario. Those cost differences for 
maintenance from three to seven are different and decisions regarding whether to analyze 
and direct the movement of additional CESE to Alameda from Williamsburg will be 
made by the staff at NAVELSG. 
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Figure 16.   Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC), Alameda 
(From Google Maps, 2010) 
Figures 17 and 18 depict the three main infrastructure locations applicable to 
establishing an Alameda training site, which are the Alameda NOSC, Alameda 
Waterfront, and Camp Parks Reserve Forces Training Area (PRFTA).  The PRFTA is a 
potential tent camp basing area and will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
This chapter has identified the infrastructure existing in both Williamsburg and 
Alameda.  Without proper Alameda infrastructure to complement the existing 
Williamsburg site, this project would be difficult to support.  It is determined that the 
three Alameda sites (Waterfront, NOSC, Camp Parks) can provide equivalent level of 




Figure 17.   Waterfront to Camp Parks (After Google Maps, 2010) 
 
Figure 18.   Waterfront to NOSC (After Google Maps, 2010) 
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IV. SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
This chapter emphasizes the cargo handling force support requirements necessary 
to conduct cargo operations.  A NCHB performs both primary and secondary missions.  
A primary mission of rapidly deploying personnel as detachments, independent units, or 
groups responding to worldwide requirements is scalable.  Another mission is the ability 
to perform Combat Service Support (CSS), which includes: (1) field messing and 
billeting for internal/organic camp staffing, (2) vehicle maintenance and dispatch, to 
include 3M and TOA management, (3) camp maintenance, capable of providing organic 
tent camp support, which includes establishment of camp power distribution trouble desk 
management, and utilities for assigned units, and (4) armory personnel to establish and 
mange a field armory for assigned units.15 
A typical battalion requires Civil Engineer Support Equipment (CESE) and life 
support equipment to operate in austere environments; however, because each battalion 
has different capabilities any particular mission may be different.  The TOA encompasses 
the entire allowance of organizational equipment and material required for mission 
accomplishment.  These missions are set up in adaptive force packages requiring portions 
or all of the TOA allotted to be utilized. 
A. TENT CAMP/LIFE SUPPORT 
Due to diverse operations throughout the world, NCHBs must have the ability to 
construct a tent camp for all of its personnel during deployments.  A tent camp 
encompasses all aspects of life support for the troops.  A basic Base X tent is illustrated 
in Figure 19, although it is possible that one unit may have a different version or model of 
tents in their TOA.16  The key takeaway is that all models are of similar size and function 
that utilize the same square footage.  The standard benchmark for the appropriate tent 
                                                 
15 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 3501.101D: Projected Operational 
Environment and Required Operational Capabilities for Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group. 
(Washington, DC). (Appendix A). 
16 The TOA for each NCHB unit was not analyzed to determine whether the exact national stock 
number (NSN) was the same for every unit.  
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camp is the existing laydown area associated with CAX referenced in Figure 20.  Tent 
camps can be constructed to support thousands of troops and have been in past exercises.  
A recent example was the Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) exercise at Camp 
Pendleton in 2009.  Referencing this exercise is of importance due to the fact that the 
cargo handlers were supported by the Army, thus they fell into an already established tent 
camp.  It will not always be the case that Navy cargo handlers will be supported by a 
different Service or a larger unit and therefore the NCHB requirement of tent camp 
construction exists in the ROC/POE. 
 
Figure 19.   Base X Tent (From Kristin McHugh, 2007) 
Illustrated in Figure 20 is the current tent camp at CAX, and is used as the 
Alameda requirement.  It is noted that this tent camp does not efficiently use the land on 
which it is built, mainly because of the availability of space at CAX.  There are two 
options to establish a tent camp in Alameda: Option A at Camp Parks and Option B at the 
NOSC (Figures 21 and 22).  Option A is preferable as it provides greater laydown area 
between the two.  The NOSC option is viable but would require personnel parking at the 
waterfront and bussing them to the NOSC. 
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Figure 20.   Cheatham Annex (CAX) (After Google Maps, 2010) 
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Figure 21.   Alameda Option A – Camp Parks (From Google Maps, 2010) 
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Figure 22.   Alameda Option B – NOSC (After Google Maps, 2010) 
The following functional areas will serve as a basic guideline to enable the reader 
to understand the associated TOA required from the existing CAX site.  During the 
course of this study, we encountered the perception that a “training TOA” existed apart 
from the main TOA. Technically, there is no such thing as a “training TOA.”  There are 
training assets that are utilized from an existing complete TOA associated with the 
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equipment, parts and supplies needed for a NCHB to conduct its mission anywhere in the 
world. Those assets that are taken from the actual TOA are referred to as a “training 
TOA.”  The term “training TOA” is simply the assets used to train a NCHB. 
The operational support areas that are organic expeditionary logistics support are 
field messing, billeting, and camp maintenance.  The field messing and billeting 
requirement is to provide berthing and messing services are up to 350 personnel.  The 
camp maintenance requirement is to provide tent camp set-up, support, and maintenance, 
including the power distribution, shower units, potable water production, Trouble Desk 
management and a limited vertical construction for a 350 personnel. 
B. CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (CESE) 
The success of establishing a second training site at Alameda, and the 
effectiveness of that site in creating and maintaining a ready cargo handing force, hinges 
on the repositioning of Civil Engineer Support Equipment (CESE) from CAX to 
Alameda, CA.  The principle tasking and capabilities of a NCHB are classified in six 
operational areas, which include: (1) MPS cargo handling operations, (2) cargo terminal 
operations, (3) ordinance reporting teams, (4) air cargo operations, (5) warehouse 
operations, and (6) fuels operations.17  Each of these operations utilizes a portion of the 
entire allotted TOA.  Each specific mission requires a variety of CESE, and serves the 
vital purpose of moving cargo from one location to another.  Individual fact sheets on 
each piece of equipment are contained in Appendix E. 
Table 3 provides a full listing the standard CESE TOA needed to perform all 
cargo operations required of a NCHB by the ROC/POE.  The data in this table was 
constructed from information in the NAVFAC (Naval Facilities) Expeditionary Logistics 
Center Advanced Base Functional Component/Table of Allowance Relational Database, 
an online relational database for the management of all expeditionary allowances.   Each 
piece of equipment has its own support, maintenance, training and qualification  
 
                                                 
17 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 3501.101D: Projected Operational 
Environment and Required Operational Capabilities for Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group. 
(Washington, DC). (Appendix A). 
 39
requirements.  An important concept to understand it that when a NCHB is tasked to 
deploy to an austere environment, the amount of CESE allocated to a particular mission 
is tailored to that mission. 
The majority of NAVELSG’s TOA is located at CAX, the same location as the 
TEU and the TOA managers.  Centralization provides consistent, comprehensive 
management of the assets for the use by NCHBs.  Centralizing also affords the 
maintenance capacity to maintain a large inventory of CESE.  When a battalion is called 
upon to deploy, they are mobilized at CAX.  From CAX, all CESE and TOA needs are 
distributed in a manner conducive to mission success. 
Currently, only a small portion of a reserve NCHB’s actual TOA is located at 
their particular home station.  This abbreviated allocation is listed in Table 4.  From a 
training perspective, each NCHB must be provided some minimal allowance in order to 
train their sailors for operational and maintenance proficiency.  This allowance, however, 
is limited by the number of Construction Mechanics (CM) assigned to the unit.  Effective 
vehicle maintenance, dispatch and licensing require an appropriate level of manning of 
those who have skills to perform preventative and corrective maintenance actions. 
To conduct the training needed at Alameda, the inventory of CESE must be 
increased.  Of the numerous exercises and training applications that utilize CESE, the 
ULTRA demands the greatest, and it is therefore the standard.  Table 5 identifies the 
equipment needs of a battalion conducting a ULTRA at CAX.  Requirements of an Air 
Cargo Company and a Fuel Company have been omitted from the analysis because from 
a cost efficiency standpoint, any duplication or complement to Williamsburg for such a 
small manning group is not advantageous.  These units utilize Air Force bases, fuel 





Table 5 is extensive and is not the norm of the ULTRAs performed for the last 
two years; however, it does reflect the maximum equipment needed for certification of a 
fully manned NCHB of 304 personnel.  ULTRA’s can be and have been scaled to employ 
less than the full manning requirement.  Table 6 illustrates the appropriate level of CESE 





Table 3.   NCHB Total Allocated CESE 
ACC CTC ESC FUEL HQCO SCC #1 SCC #2 SCC #3 SCC #4 Total
2320‐LL‐LCA‐0206 LSSV CARGO CREWCAB 4X4 TROOP SEATS 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 22
2320‐01‐195‐0532 TRUCK STAKE 6X6 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION ISO 2 6 2 10
2320‐01‐339‐8009 TRUCK TRACTOR 6X4 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION 15 1 6 7
2330‐01‐113‐8658 SEMI‐TRAILER HIGHBED 20T ROLLER/CONVEYOR DECK 40FT 1 1
2330‐01‐331‐5417 SEMITRAILER STAKE BREAKBULK/ISO CONTAINER 6 6
2330‐LL‐LC3‐2757 SEMITRAILER LOWBED 55T DED HYDRAULIC POWERED 6 6
2320‐01‐195‐0531 TRUCK DUMP 6X6 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION 10CU 1 1
2320‐01‐179‐0669 TRUCK WRECKER 6X6 DED AUTO TRANS 25 TON FRONT/ 1 1
2320‐01‐240‐2835 TRUCK TANK FUEL 4X4 DED 1500 GALLON 1 1
2330‐01‐108‐7367 TRAILER TANK 400 GALLONS STAINLESS STEEL TANK 2 8 8
3825‐01‐198‐1233 DISTRIBUTOR WATER 2 000 GAL TRUCK MOUNTED 6X6 1 1
2420‐01‐318‐9186 TRACTOR WHEELED INDUSTRIAL 4 X 2 60 NET HP MIN 1 1
2320‐LL‐LC3‐2750 TRUCK CLEANER SEPTIC TANK MTD 1 1
2320‐01‐090‐7811 TRUCK TANK AIRCRAFT REFUELING UNIT 6X4 DED 1 1
2320‐LL‐LC3‐2805 HMMWV M1151A1B1 ARMNT CARRIER FULL ARMOR 2 2
6230‐LL‐LCA‐0220 FLOODLIGHT SET MLT5060MIT 4 6 6 3 2 2 2 2 27
3930‐01‐508‐0886 TRFK FORKLIFT RT 11K EXT BOOM 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 13
3930‐LL‐LC3‐2772 TRUCK FORKLIFT 20000 LB CAP ROUGH DED 1 1
3930‐01‐522‐7364 FORKLIFT 53K CAPABILITIES DIESEL RT CONT HANDLER 3 3
3930‐LL‐LCA‐0178 TRUCK FORKLIFT 6 000 LB ELECTRIC SOLID RUBBER 1 1 1 1 4
3930‐00‐955‐3293 TRUCK K‐LOADER 25K ELEVATING PLATFORM 2 2












































Table 5.   ULTRA Required CESE 
ACC CTC ESC FUEL HQCO SCC #1 SCC #2 SCC #3 SCC #4 Total
2320‐LL‐LCA‐0206 LSSV CARGO CREWCAB 4X4 TROOP SEATS 2 4 6
2320‐01‐195‐0532 TRUCK STAKE 6X6 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION ISO 6 2 8
2320‐01‐339‐8009 TRUCK TRACTOR 6X4 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION 15 6 6
2330‐01‐113‐8658 SEMI‐TRAILER HIGHBED 20T ROLLER/CONVEYOR DECK 40FT
2330‐01‐331‐5417 SEMITRAILER STAKE BREAKBULK/ISO CONTAINER 4 4
2330‐LL‐LC3‐2757 SEMITRAILER LOWBED 55T DED HYDRAULIC POWERED 4 4
2320‐01‐195‐0531 TRUCK DUMP 6X6 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION 10CU
2320‐01‐179‐0669 TRUCK WRECKER 6X6 DED AUTO TRANS 25 TON FRONT/
2320‐01‐240‐2835 TRUCK TANK FUEL 4X4 DED 1500 GALLON 1 1
2330‐01‐108‐7367 TRAILER TANK 400 GALLONS STAINLESS STEEL TANK 2 8 8
3825‐01‐198‐1233 DISTRIBUTOR WATER 2 000 GAL TRUCK MOUNTED 6X6




6230‐LL‐LCA‐0220 FLOODLIGHT SET MLT5060MIT 6 6 2 2 2 2 20
3930‐01‐508‐0886 TRFK FORKLIFT RT 11K EXT BOOM 4 2 6
3930‐LL‐LC3‐2772 TRUCK FORKLIFT 20000 LB CAP ROUGH DED
3930‐01‐522‐7364 FORKLIFT 53K CAPABILITIES DIESEL RT CONT HANDLER 2 2
3930‐LL‐LCA‐0178 TRUCK FORKLIFT 6 000 LB ELECTRIC SOLID RUBBER 1 1 1 1 4
3930‐00‐955‐3293 TRUCK K‐LOADER 25K ELEVATING PLATFORM
7360‐LL‐LCA‐0199 KITCHEN FLD TFK 250 TRLR MTD EXPAND SELF‐CONTAINED 2 2
































































V. FLEET READINESS TRAINING PLAN AND COST-BASED 
ANALYSIS  
Establishing a West Coast training site at Alameda, California requires a 
comprehensive analysis of the costs coupled with the Fleet Readiness Training Plan 
(FRTP) framework.  This chapter has two key parts: (1) FRTP and (2) cost-based 
analysis.  The FRTP and the costs associated with training are intricately woven together.  
The more training events scheduled in Williamsburg during a FRTP cycle, the greater the 
travel costs to West Coast battalions.  The goal of this cost-based analysis is to quantify 
the total costs of conducting FRTP training events in Alameda for West Coast for 
battalions.  With improving training readiness being the ultimate goal of establishing any 
training site, it is extremely important to understand how the FRTP schedule impacts 
costs. 
We limited the cost-based analysis to quantifying current costs against potential 
cost savings.  By identifying the baseline costs in the tables and figures of this chapter, 
we could more easily present the potential cost savings.  There will be nominal and 
unexpected costs that are not included.  Costs such as fuel, berthing, and messing are 
irrelevant as they are incurred irrespective of where they are physically expended. 
A. FLEET READINESS TRAINING PLAN 
It is central that the goals of a unit’s CoC remain in line with the cargo handling 
force’s strategic goal of increasing its mission readiness.  The FRTP schedule is the 
administrative tool by which this is accomplished. 
The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan (FRP)18 is developed by FFC to meet the 
strategic and operational objective of national security and the nation’s interests.  
Operational plans (OPLANS) are put into place to respond to a myriad of real world 
contingencies in various geographical locations across the planet.  Based upon the FRP, 
NECC establishes a comprehensive design of how exactly training is to be conducted and 
                                                 
18 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 3000.15: Fleet Response Plan. 
(Washington, DC). 
 46
measured.  This plan must produce a proficient force ready to execute any OPLAN on 
relatively short notice.  Because each of NECC’s forces possesses differing capabilities, 
each FRTP is uniquely tailored to that particular component.  All NECC ISIC commands 
develop structures to support the overall total force concept in the execution of their 
respective missions. 
As noted in Chapter I, NAVELSG is the ISIC designed specifically with cargo 
handling capabilities.  NAVELSG provides policy and guidance inputs to the NECC 
TRAMAN as they relate to training and implementation of the FRTP for its cargo forces.  
Spanning forty eight months, the NAVELSG FRTP is divided into four phases 
punctuated by various milestones and certifications.  The four phases include: 
Maintenance, Basic, Advanced, Sustainment.  Figure 23 is a graphical representation of 
the FRTP, with each battalion identified by a diamond at the top of the graphic.  
Dependent on the particular phase of the FRTP cycle, differing battalions are at differing 




Figure 23.   Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) Phases 
(From Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, 2009.) 
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As stated in Chapter II, the TEU is NAVELSG’s executive agent for standardized 
training.  The TEU’s core mission revolves around enhancing and developing a NCHB’s 
readiness throughout the entire FRTP cycle.  The maintenance and basic phases, 
however, are particularly school house intensive. 
Table 7.   Formal TEU Courses 
 
The thirteen formalized school house courses instructed by the TEU are listed in 
Table 7.  These courses have a variety of requirements and/or prerequisites.  Each course 
is required to be taught by a certified 9502 instructor.  Even though a NCHB may have a 
unique and highly knowledgeable Subject Matter Expert (SME), the TEU maintains rigid 
standards by requiring formal 9502 instructor certification.  Course standardization and 
curriculum certification prevents jeopardizing the quality of instruction. 
The subjective decision whether or not to conduct classroom training in Alameda 
must be thoroughly vetted and analyzed so as not to place quantity over quality.  To 
replicate the full CAX classroom schedule in Alameda is unrealistic and cannot be 
supported with the current TEU manning.  In order that high quality instruction remains 
consistent and measurable, it is imperative that stability maintained by the consistent 
controls of the TEU staff. 
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Alameda has the classroom capability and resources for TEU personnel to teach 
these courses on site.  This analysis focuses on the infrastructure capability and not the 
capacity of executing training.  It recognizes that the TEU has limited manning may be 
prevented from conducting simultaneous classroom training on both coasts. 
The TEU administers and assesses each unit during the course of the FRTP.  This 
is done specifically during the ULT and ULTRA on location at CAX.  ULT is 
introductory/refresher training designed to solidify basic unit level cohesion.  The 
ULTRA is the most extensive exercise that certifies the unit’s ability to deploy.  It 
encompasses a full array of C2 operations with a focus on NELR integration, surface 
cargo, marshalling yard, and air cargo operations. The successful completion of the 
ULTRA marks the end of the basic phase. 
B. COST-BASED ANALYSIS (CBA) 
Our cost-based analysis (CBA) involves both sunk costs and emergent costs 
associated with personnel and equipment under the 5th NELR’s guidance.  We define 
sunk costs are those costs that NCHB-3 is currently spending on day to day operations 
such as facilities, land and equipment.  Emergent costs are those costs that result from 
establishing a second training site.  These emergent costs fall among two broad 
categories; travel and CESE relocation. 
1. Travel Costs 
Currently, there is one training site at CAX in Williamsburg, VA.  All sailors 
from NCHB-3, 5, 14 and 5th NELR are required to travel between CAX and their 
permanent duty station (illustrated in Figure 24).  They do so for a variety of reasons 
including schooling, training, and certifying events. 
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Figure 24.   Training Travel Routes 
Travel distances, time and costs are used to develop measureable means of 
evaluating the cargo force’s current operating expenses.  Table 8 reflects these metrics as 
they relate to the stand up of an Alameda training site.  The itineraries found in the table 
directly apply to the three NCHBs under the 5th NELR (NCHB-3, 5, 14).  Average flight 
costs are calculated based on current market valuation and stem from historically used 
routes. 
Table 8.   Flight Time, Distance, and Round Trip Cost 
Origin Stop Distance Time Stop Destination Time Distance Cost
Alameda 
(Oakland) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Seattle-
Tacoma
2:00 672 miles $ 400
Alameda 
(Oakland) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A Port Hueneme 
(Los Angeles)
1:15 336 miles $ 300
Alameda 
(Oakland) 
Denver 954 miles 2:30 Denver Richmond 5:30 1480 miles $ 800
Seattle-
Tacoma 




Charlotte 2120 miles 4:30 Charlotte Richmond 1:05 256 miles $ 700
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Table 9 uses the fare structure constructed in Table 8 and calculates the round trip 
costs of transporting each 304 man battalion from their home station to one of two 
destinations.  Were a single training event involving the three 5th NELR units held in 
Alameda vice Williamsburg, NAVELSG would recognize a savings of $608,000.  
Table 9.   Summary of Unit Costs for Round Trip Travel 
Unit Cost to Williamsburg Cost to Alameda Difference 
NCHB 3 (304 PAX) $ 243,200 $ 0 $ 243,200 
NCHB 5 (304 PAX) $ 364,800 $ 121,600 $ 243,200 
NCHB 14 (304 PAX) $ 212,800 $ 91,200 $ 121,600 
Total $ 820,800 $ 212,800 $ 608,000 
 
Tables 10 through 12 illustrate the cost savings afforded by reducing the need to 
fly the three West Coast NCHBs to Williamsburg, VA.  Each table is individualized to a 
NCHB and reflects of the geographical concentration of that particular unit; NCHB-3 in 
the San Francisco Bay area, NCHB-5 in the Seattle area, and NCHB-14 in the Los 
Angeles area. 
A typical unit must travel to Williamsburg for classroom training in the first year 
of the FRTP.  This year is focused on completing those classes required to obtain 
qualification prerequisites.  The second year of the FRTP includes additional class 
requirements and offers a makeup opportunity for those failing to complete classes during 
year one.  The third year of the FRTP is travel intensive, requiring two visits for both the 
the ULT and ULTRA.  Over the 48 month period of the FRTP cycle, a $2,491,600 







Table 10.   Annual NCHB-3 Cost Savings 
Unit: 
NCHB 3 





FY1 School Focused $ 243,000 $ 0 $ 243,000 
FY2 Post CART Basic Phase $ 243,000 $ 0 $ 243,000 
FY3 ULT/ULTRA Phase $ 486,000 $ 0 $ 486,000 
FY4 Mobilization/Advanced Phase $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 
Total    $ 972,000 
 
Table 11.   Annual NCHB-5 Cost Savings 
Unit: 
NCHB 5 





FY1 School Focused $ 364,800 $ 121,600 $ 243,200
FY2 Post CART Basic Phase $ 364,800 $ 121,600 $ 243,200
FY3 ULT/ULTRA Phase $ 729,600 $ 243,200 $ 486,400
FY4 Mobilization/Advanced Phase $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
Total  $ 972,800
 
Table 12.   Annual NCHB-14 Cost Savings 
Unit: 
NCHB 14 





FY1 School Focused $ 212,800 $ 91,200 $ 112,600 
FY2 Post CART Basic Phase $ 212,800 $ 91,200 $ 112,600 
FY3 ULT/ULTRA Phase $ 486,000 $ 182,400 $ 303,600 
FY4 Mobilization/Advanced Phase $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 
Total   $ 546,800 
 
Travel to Williamsburg is often necessitated by the need of a formalized course 
taught by a 9502 certified instructor.  As an alternative to current practice, classroom 
instruction in Alameda could be facilitated by flying instructors from Williamsburg to 
Alameda.  The more instructors conducting multiple classes, the more benefit to a 
battalion.  A typical high volume course required by all battalions is the “Basic Shipboard 
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Cargo Handling” course.  This course requires two instructors for every thirty to forty 
students.  Most of the course is held inside of a classroom but some portion requires on-
ship practical application.  With an intelligent training plan in place, a course such as this 
could be supported in Alameda using the classrooms at the NOSC and a MARAD ship on 
the waterfront.  Flying two instructors to Alameda instead of sending thirty to forty 
personnel to CAX would save large sums of money.  This cost savings is the easiest to 
implement with the correct planning and scheduling.  Table 13 and Figure 25 provide the 
cost analysis associated with instructors from the TEU flying to Alameda to teach 
applicable courses and conduct evaluations over the 48 month FRTP.  For interpretation 
purposes, we note that Table 13 reflects a single trip of 8 instructors for schoolhouse 
training in FY1 and FY2 and two trips of 18 evaluators for the performance of ULT and 
ULTRA in FY03.  There is no foreseen limitation as to how many trips per year 
instructors can make as long as the cost advantage is evaluated.  To maximize training 
efficiency, it would be wise to schedule a two week classroom courses every six months.  
This concept will be explained further in Chapter VI. 
Table 13.   Travel Cost of 9502 Certified TEU Instructors: 
Williamsburg to Alameda 
Unit: 
TEU Instructors 
FRTP Phase Cost of 8 instructors 
to Alameda 
Cost of 18 instructors 
to Alameda 
FY1 School Focused $ 6,400 $ 0 
FY2 Post CART Basic Phase $ 6,400 $ 0 
FY3 ULT/ULTRA Phase $ 0 $ 28, 800 
FY4 Mobilization/Advanced Phase $ 0 $ 0 




























Figure 25.   Round Trip Flight Cost: Williamsburg to Alameda 
2. CESE Relocation 
An Alameda training site will require a greater quantity of CESE on location to 
fully support larger scale training exercises.  Table 14 illustrates the onetime cost of 
$17,000 associated with transporting the deficient amount of CESE identified earlier in 
Table 6 from Williamsburg to Alameda.  We established the baseline TOA and CESE 
requirements that are consistent with the intended design and framework that the higher 
echelon implemented.  The TOA requirements were designed to meet the capability 
requirements of each battalion.  We omitted the analysis of the associated maintenance 
cost that would be incurred with the increased TOA at Alameda.   The entire cargo 
handling force has recently gone through a restructuring phase that has involved moving 
billets and manning requirements throughout the United States thus each battalion is not 
fully manned to the 304 billet authorization.  This transition will continue through the 
course of the year as each battalion’s manning increases to meet that authorization.  As 
the manning increases more CESE will be required to employ the battalion as a whole.  
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The key concept is increasing the readiness of the battalion, which can be done in 
numerous ways that involve training schedules, long range training plans, and drill 
weekend utilization of those assets. 
A training officer for a particular battalion has the ability to increase the number 
of training events as their manning increases.  As the manning increases, the CESE 
utilization increases thus the cost to maintain that equipment increases.  Currently there is 
no battalion that is fully manned that would require the full TOA necessary to perform an 
ULTRA.  It is important to note that the maintenance cost concept is a necessary follow 
on project that would need to be conducted. 
It is likely that manning will increase over time and the following CESE analysis 
hinges on that assumption.  The volume, weight and dimensions of each piece of 
equipment were gathered from the NAVFAC Expeditionary Logistics Center Advanced 
Base Functional Component/Table of Allowance Relational Database.  The surface and 
air costs estimates were provided by the transportation division of the Naval Operational 
Logistics Support Center (NOLSC)19 (McNeeley, 2010).  Air transport cost of $98,000 
would most like not be required but is provided for general information. 
                                                 








Table 14.   CESE Transportation Costs 
QTY NSN NAME WT (LB) CUBE (CF) LTH (IN) WTH (IN) HGT (IN) Truck Cost Air Cost
5 2320‐LL‐LCA‐0206 LSSV CARGO CREWCAB 4X4 TROOP SEATS 6301 868.9236 260 77 75 1,067.22$     2,204.72$    
7 2320‐01‐195‐0532 TRUCK STAKE 6X6 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION ISO 19555 1989 351 96 102 1,365.00$     6,842.29$    
5 2320‐01‐339‐8009 TRUCK TRACTOR 6X4 DED AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION 15 16220 1529.208 252 98 107 1,365.00$     5,675.38$    
3 2330‐01‐331‐5417 SEMITRAILER STAKE BREAKBULK/ISO CONTAINER 14040 1493.333 480 96 56 1,365.00$     4,912.60$    
3 2330‐LL‐LC3‐2757 SEMITRAILER LOWBED 55T DED HYDRAULIC POWERED 20870 2496 624 96 72 1,365.00$     7,302.41$    
1 2320‐01‐240‐2835 TRUCK TANK FUEL 4X4 DED 1500 GALLON 15680 1473.333 260 96 102 1,365.00$     5,486.43$    
8 2330‐01‐108‐7367 TRAILER TANK 400 GALLONS STAINLESS STEEL TANK 2 2800 610.9241 161 83 79 570.65$        1,169.70$    
1 2420‐01‐318‐9186 TRACTOR WHEELED INDUSTRIAL 4 X 2 60 NET HP MIN 14500 1422.75 271 84 108 1,365.00$     5,073.55$    
19 6230‐LL‐LCA‐0220 FLOODLIGHT SET MLT5060MIT 2360 460.0781 151 81 65 480.98$        1,111.56$    
5 3930‐01‐508‐0886 TRFK FORKLIFT RT 11K EXT BOOM 30500 1322.093 248 98 94 1,365.00$     10,671.95$ 
2 3930‐01‐522‐7364 FORKLIFT 53K CAPABILITIES DIESEL RT CONT HANDLER 118500 5801.25 585 144 119 3,201.66$     41,463.15$ 
3 3930‐LL‐LCA‐0178 TRUCK FORKLIFT 6 000 LB ELECTRIC SOLID RUBBER 12310 305.6666 131 48 84 1,313.74$     4,307.27$    
2 7360‐LL‐LCA‐0199 KITCHEN FLD TFK 250 TRLR MTD EXPAND SELF‐CONTAINED 5480 780.0919 158.3 84.9 100.3 975.30$        1,917.45$    
17,164.55$  98,138.46$   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to introduce the Navy’s cargo handling force, 
describe the capability it delivers, and explore the cost and readiness implications of 
establishing a second Navy cargo handling training site at Alameda, California.  Having a 
ready, capable cargo force is a crucial component of providing flexible options to the 
nation’s maritime strategy. 
NAVELSG has the opportunity to utilize infrastructure already in place in 
Alameda to create a secondary training site and by doing so would save costs on a year 
over year basis.  Little additional money would be needed to emulate the current training 
infrastructure located in Williamsburg.  Multiple spaces are available for classroom 
instruction at the NOSC, and MARAD ships will remain ported at the waterfront for 
years to come.  The Alameda unit, NCHB-3, regularly utilizes these assets during their 
regular training exercises.  The MARAD ships are specifically employed in the 
qualification of new personnel, running of unit level training evolutions, and proficiency 
hatch team drills.  Leasing of a ship costs approximately $30,000 for a two-week training 
event. 
Tent camp laydown space is at a premium on site at the NOSC and, therefore, it is 
much better suited to be assembled at Camp Parks, a training area designed specifically 
for field exercises.  While it lies twenty-eight miles from the waterfront, this is no farther 
than from CAX using the waterfront at Newport News in Virginia. 
The maintenance facility and associated manning is the most limiting element of 
expanding the utilization of Alameda on the whole.  There is sufficient laydown area to 
support an increase in inventory, however, the maintenance bays have limited capacity.  
In the event of the untimely failure of multiple pieces of material handling equipment, a 
back log of repairs would ensue with an accompanying reduction in unit capability for 
some period of time that would be a function of the types of repairs necessary.  Although 
a new NCHB-5 CESE maintenance facility was recently completed at Joint Base Lewis-
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McChord, Washington, the authors remain supportive of consolidation of CESE at the 
Alameda site because of the other assets, capabilities and characteristics that make it 
possible to perform an ULTRA.  Transporting the full amount of CESE to support a 304 
person ULTRA from Williamsburg would cost approximately $17,000.  This relocation 
would require an increase in billeted mechanics to maintain the larger inventory. 
A two coast concept provides significant longer term cost savings.  Most of this 
savings results from a reduction in travel costs.  Chapter V highlighted these savings by 
conducting FRTP training in Alameda for all three of the 5th NELR’s battalions.  Basic 
and maintenance phase training could be accomplished by flying a limited number of 
TEU instructors to Alameda.  The ULT and ULTRA training events demand 
progressively greater resources both in terms of evaluators/instructors and support 
equipment.  Conducting training for NCHB 3, 5, and 14 in Alameda instead of routing 
these entire battalions to Williamsburg, potentially saves $2.5 million in travel costs over 
the course of FRTP cycle. 
Implementing a dual coast training site to achieve cost efficiency should not 
solely influence the decision making process, however most of the costs associated with 
Alameda will exist whether a training unit is established there or not.  Choosing a 
complementary site option should not diminish the TEU’s importance in cargo handling 
training; uniformity of training, assessment and certification under the auspice of the 
TEU is a critical responsibility of the organization. 
The attractiveness of a West Coast training site lies in its potential to host cross-
training under a combined 5th NELR training plan.  It is clear that Alameda possesses the 
capabilities to conduct all levels of training for surface cargo operations but as with any 
training, having the assets available does not ensure their effective use.  Consistent 
expectations and well known objectives must be clear for the development of each sailor 




Based upon our analysis and conclusions, we recommend that NAVELSG 
establish a West Coast training site in Alameda, California, which will result in 
maintaining or improving current levels of readiness, a reduction in costs for moving 
personnel to the training facility, and provide increased flexibility and robustness to cargo 
handling training.  Having weighed the risks and rewards, we recommend the following 
actions. 
 Transfer CESE to Alameda as manning grows.  In our cost-based 
analysis, we identified that CESE necessary to conduct an ULTRA for a 
304 man battalion.  No NCHB is fully manned to their billeted allotment 
and therefore could not perform every capability to the full extent required 
of the ROC/POE.  Over time, these manning deficiencies will improve and 
eventually the full complement of the CESE will be needed.  We 
recommend moving that CESE to Alameda, which would provide 
immediate training benefit subject to reasonable utilization.  We would 
like to note that NCHB-3 currently does not possess a MMV, a basic piece 
CESE.  We recommend NAVELSG perform a complete analysis of CESE 
allocation and utilization for every battalion, especially before expanding a 
maintenance facility.  We reviewed CESE hours and mileage of utilization 
of several battalions over the course of the last year and found it 
surprisingly low.  We have no intention of offending anyone; hence the 
raw data was not included.  Our focus is on finding the appropriate 
training avenues to achieve readiness efficiencies throughout the force. 
 Do not duplicate the TEU in Alameda.  Duplicating the TEU at 
Williamsburg in Alameda would not efficiently use NAVELSG resources 
nor would it provide the needed consistency.  We recommend the 
Alameda training site be an augment to the existing TEU training site.  
There are numerous training events that can be conducted in Alameda that 
would save the cargo handling force substantial travel costs. 
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 Conduct basic and advanced cargo courses at Alameda for West 
Coast units.  We estimate that an average of 140 students can attend 
courses in Alameda in a given year.  This equates to conducting a basic 
and advance cargo handling class twice a year over a two week period.  
We recommend that these courses be taught during designated ship use 
training events of NCHB 3.  This allows the students to obtain needed 
classroom training along with shipboard practical experience.  
Synchronizing these events together maximizes efficiencies.  Benefits 
include the gaining of additional qualified operators, mass participation, 
battalion cohesiveness, maximization of time, and the leveraging of 
SME’s under 9502 instructor supervision. 
 Leverage NCHB SME knowledge.  Throughout the cargo force, each 
unit possesses some of the most qualified and exceptional teachers of the 
cargo trade.  The ability to leverage these personnel provides a thrust to 
readiness capability.  This network of experience lies random and 
dispersed and should be used to its fullest potential.  Arguments will be 
made that battalions can gain greater efficiency by teaching their own 
unique courses; however any step in that direction will completely hinder 
any form of a consistent training program.  The TEU must remain at the 
core of training policy and decisions.  The TEU is NAVELSG’s executive 
agent for training and is the only entity able to execute Navy certified, 
formalized courses.  This does not mitigate the importance of SME’s for 
vital follow on training.  Completion of a formal course is just the first 
step into obtaining seasoned qualified personnel.  Utilizing battalion 
resources effectively provides TEU assessment teams with a substantial 
knowledge pool, enabling the TEU to tap the skilled professionals within 
all the 5th NELR subordinate units.  Maintaining predetermined standards 
by which all training is conducted ensures critical success factors and 
ensures reliability across the force. 
 61
 Establish training event teams.  These teams would consist of four to six 
sailors from each battalion that plan and execute training metrics.  
Currently, there are many tracking mechanisms in place for all the 
battalions; however none are real time training catalysts.  They must 
monitor on a daily basis key aspects of training; “Is the intent of the 
training being met?” and “Is what was planned being executed?”  This is a 
very dynamic process with every battalions training needs being slightly 
different.  For example, one battalion may have plenty of Hold Boss 
qualified individuals but lack Crane Operators.  This common sense 
monitoring by the training team would allow shifting more of a focus on 
remedying the battalion’s deficiencies and/or shortfalls. 
 Execute with deliverables.  Reserve battalions are faced with numerous 
challenges, one of which is the absolute finiteness of time available to 
complete all assigned tasking.  A reservist’s drilling time is limited and 
any event that detracts from training such as administration duties, 
command visits, PFA, executing AT in non-supportive roles only hinders 
the overall readiness of each unit.  This means that every training event 
must be thoroughly planned with expectations articulated for the intended 
outcome down to the individual level.  All too often we observed the 
CESE not being utilized in the most efficient means or simply not being 
utilized at all.  This statement is not intended to be viscously critical but to 
shed light on a cost that the cargo handling force incurs by having CESE 
located at all battalions.  CESE assets should be maximized and utilized 
every drill weekend to ensure each battalion sustains a vast majority of 
qualified personnel. Maximizing time and assets, will pay huge dividends. 
 Implement control measures.  The 5th NELR should establish a 
standardized Long Range Training Plan (LRTP), focusing on the 
expectations of its battalions and the efficient usage of such a training site.  
Management controls are critical in all organizations.  The Navy 
leadership in the cargo handling force is required to meet high standards 
 62
while improving all aspects of its command.  Instituting proper controls 
and measures for the efficient use of resources and directing the proper 
training for the purpose of meeting the command’s objectives are 
instrumental to increasing the readiness of that command. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Throughout the process of our analysis we identified various potential follow-on 
projects that would aid NAVELSG in increasing readiness and operations as a whole.  
We highly recommend continuing this series of potential thesis projects at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) focused on identifying efficiencies and effectiveness of all 
aspects of NAVELSG.  The potential follow on projects that would make good NPS 
theses are listed below. 
 The analysis of the manning and maintenance costs of all NCHBs in 
relation to effective training and readiness.  Focus should be placed on 
additional CESE located in Alameda versus dispersed TOA. 
 The analysis of proper control measures and asset utilization consistent 
with the objectives of the ROC/POE. 
 The analysis of budget allowances with a direct relation to readiness.  This 
is a “bang for the buck” concept. 
 The analysis of life support capabilities.  Specifically, the requirement of 
tent camp construction and maintenance in austere environments.  
Training and execution were observed to be mismatched. 
 The analysis of reserve billets associated with each NCHB and those 
sailors filling those billets traveling from distant locations. 
 The analysis of the appropriate TOA specific to each NCHB. 
 63


































































































































































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 119
APPENDIX B.  MARAD SHIP PRICING 
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APPENDIX C.  READY RESERVE FORCE LAYDOWN 
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APPENDIX D.  ALAMEDA MAINTENANCE FACILITY 
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APPENDIX E.  CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (CESE) 








Rated Load Capacity 15.00 Tons 
Drive Wheel Quantity 6 
Rear Wheel Mounting Type Dual 
Height Prime Mover Type Diesel Engine 
Transmission Type Automatic 
Cargo Area Nominal Length 216 In 
Cargo Area Nominal Height 95 In 
Body Material Steel and Wood 
Length  351 in 
Width 96 in 
Height  102 in 
Weight 19,555 lb 
NSNLOCATOR.com 
NAVFAC Expeditionary Logistics Center, 
Advanced Base Functional Component/Table of Allowance Relational Database 
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Light Service Support Vehicle (LSSV), 
(NSN 2320-LL-LCA-0206) 
The Light Service Support Vehicle (LSSV) is manufactured by GM Defense and is 
produced in the following models: 
 Cargo/Troop Carrier Pickup (Base, Extended Cab or Crew Cab) 
 Cargo/Troop Carrier/Command Tahoe 
 Cargo/Troop Carrier/Command Suburban 
 Ambulance 
The LSSV command model utilizes the 1500 Tahoe and 2500 Suburban while the LSSV 
pickup models are based on the Chevrolet 2500HD 1-ton chassis. 
Militarization of standard GM trucks to produce the LSSV included exterior changes 
such as CARC paint (Forest Green, Desert Sand, or three-color Camouflage), blackout 
lights, military bumpers, brush guard, NATO slave receptacle, NATO trailer receptacle, 





Overall Dimensions  
Length  260 in 
Width 77 in 
Height  75 in 
Weight 6,301 lb 
NAVFAC Expeditionary Logistics Center, 
Advanced Base Functional Component/Table of Allowance Relational Database 
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M-915, Truck, Tractor, Line Haul 50,000 GVWR, 
(NSN 2320-01-028-4395) 
The M-915 Line-Haul Tractor (Truck, Tractor, 14-ton, 6x4) is used primarily in active 
and reserve component transportation units for the rapid, efficient transport of bulk 
supplies from ocean ports to division support areas within a theater of operation. 
AM General produced M-915 series variants M-915 and M-915 A1, then Freightliner 
produced the M-915 A2 through M-915 A5, based upon commercial FLD120 tractors. 
   
Overall Dimensions  
Length  268.5 in 
Width 96.75 in 
Height  134.63 in 
Ground Clearance 10.25 in 
Fording Depth 20 in 
GCWR 105,000 lb 
Empty Net Weight 19,630 lb 
Fuel Capacity 118 gal 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit, Direct Support, and General Support Maintenance Manual 
TM 9-2330-273-10 Headquarters, Department Of The Army, May 1980 
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M-871 A3, Semitrailer, Tactical, Drop Deck  
Break Bulk/ Container Transporter,  22-1/2 Ton,  
(NSN 2330-01-458-6865) 
The M871A3 semitrailer is a 22 1/2-ton drop deck/break bulk (DD/BB) container 
transporter. It is a tactical, dual purpose, bulk, and container transporter. It transports 
twenty foot International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Containers on line haul 







Trailer Dimensions  
Length  42 ft 2 in 
Width 8 ft 1 in 
Height Overall 78.5 in 
Ground Clearance 12 in 
Fording Depth 30 in 
VEHICLE WEIGHTS:  
Highway or Improved Roads 45,000 lb 
Empty Net Weight 17,660 lb 
Axles 2 Set Dual Tandem 
Wheels Hub Pilot 
R i m size 22.5 in x 8.25 in 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit, Direct Support, and General Support Maintenance Manual 
TM 9-2330-326-14&P,  Headquarters, Department Of The Army, February 2006 
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M-872 A4, Semitrailer, Flatbed: Break Bulk 
Container Transporter, 34 Ton,  (NSN 2330-01-497-0706) 
The M872A4 Series Flatbed Semitrailer is a cargo hauling semitrailer designed to carry 
containerized or breakbulk cargo.  It is designed to be towed by the M915 Series 6 x 4 





Trailer Dimensions  
Length  43 ft 10 in 
Width 96 in 
Height Overall 106.25 in 
Ground Clearance 12 in 
Fording Depth 30 in 
VEHICLE WEIGHTS:  
GCVR w/M915A3 Tractor 105,000 lb 
Highway or Improved Roads 67,200 lb 
Empty Net Weight 18,800 lb 
Axles 3 Set Dual Tandem 
Wheels Hub Pilot 
R i m size 22.5 in x 8.25 in 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit, Direct Support, and General Support Maintenance Manual 
TM 9-2330-331-14&P, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, December 2005 
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M-870 A3,  Trailer, Medium Heavy Equipment Transporter (MHET), 
40 Ton, (NSN 2330-01-458-2061) 
The M870A3 semitrailer low-bed is a hydraulic detachable system capable of 
transporting engineer equipment, tracked vehicles, wheeled vehicles or other payloads 
up to 80,000 pounds on highways, unimproved roads (graded gravel), and cross 
country. The semitrailer is a multi-axle state-of-the-art trailer with vehicle front end 
loading capability, dual 12/24 volt electrical system including light emitting diode (LED) 





Trailer Dimensions  
Length  45 ft 5.3 in 
Width 8 ft 6 in 
Height Overall 105 in 
Ground Clearance 16 in 
Fording Depth 20 in 
GCVW 131,800 lb 
Empty Net Weight 23,950 lb 
Axles 3 Set Dual Tandem 
Wheels Hub Pilot 
R i m size 22.5 in x 9 in 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit, Direct Support, and General Support Maintenance Manual 
TM 5-2330-325-14&P Headquarters, Department Of The Army, June 2004 
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M-149, Trailer, Tank, 400 Gallon 
(Water Buffalo) (NSN 2330-00-542-2039) 
The M149, M149A1, and M149A2 Water Tank Trailers are designed to carry 400 gal. of 
potable or nonpotable water either highway or cross-country. 
The trailers are designed to be towed by an M35 Series 2½ Ton Truck. Maximum 






Trailer Dimensions  
Length  161 in 
Width 80 in 
Height 76.5 in 
Ground Clearance 17 in 
Tank Capacity 400 gal 
Empty Net Weight 2,900 lb 
Axles 1 
Wheels Military Offset Disk 
R i m size 20 in x 7.5 in 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit, Direct Support, and General Support Maintenance Manual 
TM 9-2330-267-14&P, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, July 1991 
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M-878, Truck, Tractor, Yard Type 4X2, 
(NSN 2320-01-452-5579) 
The M-878 A2 Yard Tractor moves (“spots”) trailers in a terminal yard environment and 
in roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) marine operations. Use of this vehicle on a public road or 
highway is NOT authorized.  A hydraulically-controlled fifth wheel can be raised or 
lowered thirty two inches has a 70,000 lb vertical load capacity, and is compatible with a 
two-inch kingpin.  A cab-controlled, air-operated latching cylinder unlocks fifth wheel 




Overall Dimensions  
Length  198.64 in 
Width 98 in 
Height 124.05 in 
Ground Clearance 9.5 in 
Engine Diesel, turbocharged 
Horsepower 275 hp @ 2400 rpm 
GVWR 46,662 lb 
Fuel Capacity 50 gal 
Axles 2 
Wheels Hub Pilot 
R i m size 22.5 in x 8.25 in 
Technical Manual, Operator's Manual, 
TM 9-2320-312-10, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, December 2003 
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Millennia Military Vehicle (MMV), 
(NSN 3930-01-508-0886) 
The MMV telehandler features a variable load capacity through the use of two different 
fork attachments. It is capable of moving all palletized classes of material up to its rated 
capacity, with an optimum lifting range of 4,000 to 11,000 pounds. The MMV has a 
maximum lift height just over forty two feet and a maximum horizontal reach of twenty 
nine feet. The MMV can operate in rough terrain and is self-deployable with a maximum 
off-road speed of thirty five miles per hour and a cruising range of 425 miles. The MMV 
is also air-transportable in CH-53 and KC/C-130 aircraft. 
 
   
 
Overall Dimensions  
Length  20 ft 8 in 
Width 8 ft 4 in 
Height  7 ft 10 in 
Ground Clearance 15.1 in 
Fuel Capacity 45 gal 
Engine Cummins turbo-diesel 
Turning radius 16 ft 4 in 
Boom tilt angle (max) 84° 
Max Reach 31 ft  
Max Lift Height 42 ft 4 in 
U.S. Marine Corps Technical Manual for Principal Technical Characteristics of U.S. Marine Corps 
Engineer Equipment, TM 11275-15/3D Marine Corps Systems Command, June 2009 
JLG Industries, Inc. Press release date: July 1, 2008 
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All Terrain Lifter, Army System (ATLAS),  
(NSN 3930-01-417-2886) 
The All Terrain Lifter, Army System (ATLAS) is a five ton (10,000 pound) capacity, 
variable reach, rough terrain forklift. It is intended to perform the same type of cargo 
handling operations as earlier Army 10K forklifts under a wide variety of conditions.  
The ATLAS built by Trak International, Inc. of Port Washington, WS has a maximum lift 
capacity of five tons with a three-stage telescopic boom.  The system has the ability to tilt 
the frame up to thirty degrees to the left and right to ensure that the load is always level. 
With a 165-horsepower engine, the ATLAS has a maximum speed of twenty three miles 
per hour on the road. There are three forward speeds and reverse. 
 
       
 
Overall Dimensions  
Length  356.3 in 
Width 100.2 in 
Height  107 in 
Ground Clearance 15.2 in 
Fuel Capacity 44 gal 
Engine Cummins 6 cylinder 165 hp 
Turning radius 13 ft 11 in 
Boom tilt angle (max) 45° 
Max Reach w/10K carriage 26 ft 4 in 
Max Lift Height w/10K carriage (10k lbs) 16 ft 11 in 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit, Direct Support, and General Support Maintenance Manual 
TM 10-3930-673-10 Headquarters, Department Of The Army, May 1998 
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RT 240, Rough Terrain Container 
Handler (RTCH), (NSN 3930-01-473-3998) 
The Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH, pronounced 'wretch') provides the 
capability to handle standard ANSI/ISO cargo containers that are increasingly the 
backbone of military logistics. 
The Kalmar RT-240 Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) is powered by a six-
cylinder turbocharged diesel Cummins QSM 11 engine, 400 hp using JP-8 fuel and can 
move containers up to 53,000 lbs. The Kalmar RTCH has a movable operators cab and 
folding boom assembly to reduce transport height so it can be transported by air (C-5 or 
C-17 drive-on), sea, rail or road without any disassembly. It operates on beaches, rough 
terrain and unimproved surfaces where it can stack containers three high and has the 
reach capability to pick up a container in the second row. 
   
Overall Dimensions  
Length  49.2 ft 
Width 12 ft 
Height  9.8 ft 
Ground Clearance 18 in 
Lifting Capacity 53,000 lb 
Fording Depth 60 in 
GVWR 118,000 lb 
Fuel Capacity 103 gal 
Technical Manual, Operator's Manual 
TM 10-3930-675-10-1 Headquarters, Department Of The Army, December 2006 
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K Loader, 25,000 Lb Capacity, 
(NSN 3930-00-955-3293) 
The Halvorsen loader is a rapidly deployable, high-reach mechanized aircraft loader that 
can transport and lift up to 25,000 pounds of cargo onto military and civilian aircraft. 
The loader is highly mobile and can transport a full load of cargo at a maximum speed of 
seventeen mph. Its versatile deck elevates from thirty nine inches to eighteen feet, four 
inches and employs a powered conveyer system to move cargo. The deck has pitch, roll, 
and side-to-side adjustment for quick, efficient interface with all military and commercial 
cargo aircraft, including the B-747, L-1011, and DC-10. The loader has a 100-inch 
wheel-to-wheel width for loading/unloading and transport operations. The loader is easily 
configured from operational to transport mode, which reduces the width from 170 inches 
to 109 inches. The chassis is also hydraulically adjustable to facilitate driving the loader 
on or off the C-130, C-141, C-5, or C-17 for air transport. The FMC Halvorsen loader is a 
versatile, durable vehicle with unmatched performance. 
     
General Characteristics  
Weight (unloaded) 31,350 lbs 
Width (operation) 170 in 
Width (air transport) 109 in 
Length 29 ft 6 in 
Deck Height, (variable) 39 in to 18 ft 4 in 
Maximum Speed (loaded) 17 mph 
Maximum Payload 25,000 lbs 
Turning Diameter 50 ft 
Air Mobility Command Fact Sheet, June 2007 
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MKT-75A, Kitchen, Field, Trailer Mounted, 
(NSN 7360-01-092-0470) 
 
The Mobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT) is an expandable self-contained mobile kitchen 
facility for preparation of A and B rations for approximately 250 personnel and tray-pack 
rations for approximately 300 personnel. 
The MKT has the capability of opening, handling, serving and transposing tray-pack 
foods. Tray-pack menu items are hermetically sealed, half-size steam table containers in 
which about 105 ounces (three kilograms) of food (ten to twenty five servings) have been 
thermally processed. The tray-pack items can be transported and stored without 
refrigeration until needed.  Ramp corner struts provide support to the ramp. Shock 
absorbers protect components during travel.  Platform leveling is performed with a 
leveling jack. Corner posts support the roof system. Tentage is attached to tent pole 
assemblies with tie downs and straps. Safety rails are inserted into pole assemblies and 
corner posts 
    
Overall Dimensions  
Length  171 in 
Width 92 in 
Height  93 in 
Weight 4,680 lb 
Feeding Capacity 250 personnel per meal 
Technical Manual, Operator's, Unit And Direct Support Maintenance Manual, 
TM-10-7360-206-13, Headquarters, Department Of The Army, March 2002 
 138







Overall Dimensions  
Length  289 – 499 in 
Width 96 in 
Height 123 in 
Engine Cummins ISB-10, 200-260 hp 
Transmission Allison 2500 PTS 
Brakes 4 wheel anti-lock hydraulic disc 
brakes 
GVWR 31,000 lb 
Tank Capacity 60 gal 
Wheelbase/ Passenger Capacity 189 in = 48  
 217 in = 54 
 252 in = 66 
 280 in = 77 
Blue Bird Vision®Technical Specification Fact Sheet 
Blue Bird Corporation, August 2010 
 
 139
LIST OF REFERENCES 
City of Alameda. “Alameda Point Community Partners Declines To Proceed With 
Developing Alameda Point.” Press release, Alameda, CA, September 21, 2006. 
City of Alameda, Alameda Reuse and Redevelopment Authority, “Recommendation to 
Approve a 20 year Lease with the Department of Transportation Maritime 
Administration (MARAD),” Memorandum, February 1, 2006. 
Contingency Tracking System (CTS). “Daily Processing Files.” Defense Manpower Data 
Center September 21, 2010. Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20100921ngr.pdf. 
Conway, James T., Gary Roughead, and Thad W. Allen. “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower (CS-21).” (Washington, D.C., 2007). Accessed November 11, 
2010. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. 
Conway, James T., Gary Roughead, and Thad W. Allen. “Naval Operations Concept 
2010: Implementing The Maritime Strategy.” (Washington, DC, 2010). Accessed 
November 11, 2010. http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf.  
Eckols, Christopher W. and Jeffrey A. Tomaszewski. “Naval Expeditionary Logistics 
Support Group, Training and Evaluation Unit: An Analysis of Current Operations 
while Searching for Training Efficiencies.” MBA professional report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009. 
Ellson, Michele. “SunCal Sues The City Of Alameda.” The Island, August 5, 2010. 
McHugh, Kristin. “Sixteen Person Tent.” Stanley Foundation, February 2007. Accessed 
November 11, 2010 http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/africa/ig/Scenes-from-
Djibouti.--1q/Sixteen-person-tent.htm. 
McNeeley, Donald. “CESE Contracted Transportation Costs.” E-mail from 
Transportation & Distribution Optimization Department Director, Naval 
Operational Logistics Support Center, Norfolk, VA, September 10, 2010. 
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. 2010. COMNECCINST 3502.1A: Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command Training Manual. Williamsburg, VA: C.M. 
Pottenger. 
———. 2010. COMNECCINST 5440.3: Mission, Functions, and Tasks for Commander, 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group. Norfolk, VA: C.M. Pottenger. 
 
 140
———. “NECC Force Capabilities.” May 2010. Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/necc/Documents/01_NECC_FactSheet%20-
%20V3.pdf. 
———. 2009. “COMNECCINST 3500.3: Navy Mission Essential Task List.” 
Williamsburg, VA: M.E. Kosnik. 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group. “NAVELSG Organizational Structure” 
NECC Commander’s Conference Powerpoint Presentation, Williamsburg, VA, 
December 2009. 
———. “Training Evaluation Unit Functions And Structure” NECC Commander’s 
Conference Powerpoint Presentation, Williamsburg, VA., December 2009. 
———. “Training and Readiness (N7)” NECC Commander’s Conference Powerpoint 
Presentation, Williamsburg, VA., December 2009. 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “CNO Guidance For 2010: Executing The 
Maritime Strategy.” (Washington, DC, 2009). Accessed November 11, 2010 
http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202010.pdf. 
———. 2006. “OPNAVINST 3000.15: Fleet Response Plan.” Washington, DC: R.F. 
Willard. 
———. 2008. “OPNAVINST 3501.101D: Projected Operational Environment and 
Required Operational Capabilities for Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support 
Group.” Washington, DC: M.K. Loose. 
———. 2008. “OPNAVINST 3501.360: Defense Readiness Reporting System—Navy.” 
Washington, DC: M.K. Loose. 
U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. (Washington, DC 
2010). Accessed November 11, 2010. 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. 
U.S. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommitte on Defense. Statement of Vice 
Admiral Dirk J. Debbink, Chief of Navy Reserve. 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 
2009. 
 141
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Mark Hellman 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
 
4. Mark Sakowski 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
 
5. Jason Parkhouse 
Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group Training Evaluation Unit 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
 
6. Daniel Pionk 
FIFTH Navy Expeditionary Logistics Regiment 
Point Magu, California 
